Mike McLennan, (the “Complaint”) and Teamsters Local Union No. 464, (the “Union”) and Fraser Valley Milk Producers Cooperative Association (Dairyworld Milk), (the “Employer”)
Richards S. Longpre V-Chair
Judgment: February 20, 1997
Docket: B59/97
Counsel: Ib Petersen, for Complainant
David B. Stevenson, for Union
Richards S. Longpre V-Chair:
(i) Introduction
1 This matter involves a complaint pursuant to Section 13 of the Labour Relations Code by Mr. Mike McLennan. McLennan’s legal counsel clarified his complaint and set out three specific complaints:
- whether there was a failure on the part of the Union to properly handle Mr. McLennan’s grievances when the Union failed to investigate his grievances and communicate with him about his grievances before, during and after the grievance process;
- whether there was a duty on the part of the Union to represent Mr. McLennan with respect to his grievances which were in part based on certain policies and practices in place at Mr. McLennan’s place of employment; and
- whether there was a duty on the part of the Union to intervene in the harassment by supervisors and management employees of the employer arising mainly out of work related issues or in the grievances process under the collective agreement.
2 In making a submission, dated April 23, 1996 McLennan expanded the scope of his complaint. In a case management meeting, the parties agreed that there would be a hearing on October 29, 1996 where they would make oral argument on those aspects of the complaint that arose before July 25, 1995. This decision deals with those matters. I apologize for the four months it has taken to issue this decision.
3 It should also be noted that on May 2, 1995 the Board determined that McLennan’s complaint disclosed a prima facie case. The Board invited the Union and the Employer to make written submissions. The Employer never made a submission. The Union made its submission on May 30, 1995 (the “May 30 submission”). McLennan responded to the Union’s submission on July 25, 1995 (the “July 25 submission”).
(ii) Background
4 A brief review of events is as follows. McLennan filed his complaint in November 1994. His complaint was based on the Union’s failure to pursue a number of grievances on his behalf. Prior to December 13, 1994 the Deputy Registrar of the Board discussed the complaint with both parties. The Union agreed to investigate McLennan’s grievances and discuss them with him. The Deputy Registrar wrote to the parties confirming this understanding. Discussions between the parties never took place.
5 On May 18, 1995 the Board again brought the parties together to discuss McLennan’s complaint. In a letter to the parties on May 25, 1995 the Board sets out the agreement of the parties reached at that meeting. The Union agreed to respond to the “essential elements of the complaint’s section 12 complaint as identified in the informal discussions at the LRB.” McLennan would have the opportunity to make a final reply.
6 McLennan’s complaint raised the Union’s conduct with respect to four different dates on which grievances were filed: March 18, 1994, August 20, 1994, August 26, 1994, and November 12, 1994.
7 The March 18 grievance raised several matters. A grievance meeting was held with the Employer on April 4. McLennan discussed the merits of his case with the Employer. The Union said very little. Apparently, McLennan’s conversation with the Employer broke down. The Employer’s comments to McLennan were rude and allegedly constituted harassment.
8 On August 20 McLennan filed another grievance. McLennan raised his March 18 matters and one new matter. On August 26 McLennan raised further issues. Some of those issues related to the March 18 and August 20 grievances. Spome issues were raised for the first time. During the September 22, 1994 grievance meeting, McLennan says the Union never assisted him in presenting the merits of his grievance. Again, the Employer allegedly berated and yelled at McLennan. McLennan was also charged by the Employer with insubordination; the Union remained quiet.
9 On November 12 McLennan filed another grievance. McLennan asserts the Union failed to investigate the merits of the grievance prior to the meeting. At the same time, McLennan filed this Section 12 complaint
10 The Union’s May 30 submission addressed grievances from March 18, August 20 and 26 and November 12, 1994. The grievances, and the reasons the grievances were not pursued, were addressed in the submission. Certain August 26 grievances were not specifically addressed.
11 On July 25, 1995 McLennan submitted a letter to the Board addressing the points made in the Union’s May 30 submission. The Union and the Employer received copies of this submission in mid-September 1995. The complaint lay dormant until early 1996 when McLennan informed the Board that he wished to proceed with his Section 12 complaint. As noted earlier, new issues arose later in the year but those issues are being left out of these proceedings.
(iii) Argument
12 McLennan raised a number of arguments concerning the Union’s role in the grievance investigations and meetings in 1994 and in its May 30 submission to the Board. McLennan argued that the Union did not properly investigate all of the grievances. Prior to the grievance meetings, the Union did not discuss the merits of the grievances with McLennan. The Union’s representative did nothing to assist McLennan at the grievance meetings. The Union did not investigate the facts before deciding not to pursue his grievances. It did nothing to stop the Employer’s insulting comments in the grievance meetings and elsewhere.
13 McLennan argued that the Union’s May 30 submission does not refer to all of the matters raised in the Section 12 complaint. The May 30 submission does not deny all allegations. On one issue, the Union referred to the wrong article of the collective agreement. The merits of other grievances were not denied. McLennan argued the Union took an incorrect and an unduly narrow view of the collective agreement in its May 30 response to McLennan’s grievances.
14 McLennan also challenged the Union’s arguments. The Union says that it had discussions with McLennan. In response, McLennan noted the lack of details in the Union’s submission of these discussions. The Union says its May 30 submission set out the reasons for not pursuing McLennan’s grievances. McLennan argued that the May 30 submission demonstrates the Union’s arbitrary conduct. His counsel’s written argument reads, in part:
In my submission, which flows from the uncontradicted allegations of fact set out above, the Union did not investigate the merits of Mr. McLennan’s grievances, did not obtain his view of the facts and circumstances from him, and did not represent him in actual grievance meetings with the company. As such the Unions conduct is at least arbitrary, in the sense that is can be described as “superficial, capricious, indifferent, or in reckless disregard for Mr. McLennan’s interests” (Practice Guideline No. 3) And motivated by bad faith, for example, protection of a cozy relationship with management which protected jobs of relatives. As well, the Union and its representatives became increasingly dissatisfied and unhappy with Mr. McLennan raising concerns about the collective agreement and management. In short, the Union did not like McLennan “rocking the boat”. In addition, McLennan’s complaints regarding the quality of representation he had received during the grievance process in all likelihood did not endear him to the Union.
McLennan made further arguments, however, these are the issues with merit.
15 In response, the Union relied upon its full participation in the processing of McLennan’s grievances. While there was little formal communication, telephone conversations with McLennan did take place. Grievance meetings were held. The May 30 submission addressed the reasoning it followed in addressing McLennan’s grievances. All of the issues raised by McLennan were addressed, in their entirety, in the May 30 submission. McLennan’s grievances were not pursued because the Union did not agree with his interpretation of the collective agreement. For example, McLennan sought a leave of absence during Christmas: he sought the leave eight months prior to Christmas. The Union also noted specific provisions of the collective agreement contrary to McLennan’s grievances.
16 The Union argued that each and every issue with sufficient specificity was addressed by the Union. The Union acknowledged that its representative was not aware of all details at the time the grievances were discussed. It acknowledged that this caused some delay in a final resolution of some matters. It argued, however, that the delay was of little significance. The Union’s July 9, 1996 submission reads:
In the context of the statutory duty, delay which does not result in a loss of rights under the grievance procedure or collective agreement is treated as technical. Even where a union could have been more diligent in communicating with a grievor no breach will be found if there is no detriment to the rights of the complainant under the collective agreement. That principle applies in this case. Mr. McLennan has not lost any rights under the collective agreement by reason of Mr. Hamilton not communicating with him in a formal or, for the purposes of this submission, timely manner.
The Union argued that given all of the Union’s representation of McLennan through these proceedings the burden of proving bad faith cannot be met. The Union did turn its mind to all grievances and disagreed with his interpretation of the collective agreement. With respect to the issues of abuse and harassment by the Employer, issues outside the terms of the collective agreement were raised. The collective agreement provided no remedies for McLennan in these matters and a grievance was not pursued.
(iv) Analysis
17 I see the following issues before me. First, the Union’s failure to investigate McLennan’s grievances prior to the grievance meetings with the Employer that occurred in 1994. Second, the Union’s failure to speak on McLennan’s behalf at the grievance meetings. Third, the Union’s position that it could do nothing in response to the Employer’s conduct at the grievance meetings towards McLennan. Finally, did the Union’s May 30, 1995 submission in response to the grievances, meet its obligations under Section 12 of the Code.
18 McLennan’s final submission asks rhetorically if the Union had a duty to represent him. Clearly it does. The extent and the nature of representation required by Section 12 has been set out in numerous Section 12 (formerly Section 7) decisions. Applicable to this case, the Board does not considered a Section 12 complaint on a single incident, isolated from all circumstances. A union’s conduct throughout the relevant period of time must be considered as a whole (Callow, Re [(June 24, 1996), Doc. B213/96 (B.C. L.R.B.)], BCLRB NO. 213/96). The Board has said that inadvertent errors and simple negligence are not covered by Section 12. A union is obliged, however, to consider the merits of its member’s grievance in an informed way. The Board will not second guess the judgement of a union so long as its decision to not purse a member’s grievance is based on a reasoned judgement (Sobecki and IAMAW, Lodge No. 62, Re [(September 19, 1995), Doc. B346/95 (B.C. L.R.B.)], BCLRB No. B346/95 and Havens, Re [(November 27, 1995), Doc. B423/95 (B.C. L.R.B.)], LD No. B423/95). Certainly, a union can have a different interpretation of the collective agreement than the grievor. The only issue is whether that is a consistent, reasoned interpretation. The Board’s jurisprudence goes on to permit the union to settle grievances despite the grievor’s objection, when its decision is based on an understanding of the merits of the case.
(v) General Comments
19 I start with addressing four general issues raised in this case.
20 First, the Union argued that the merits of the complaint could not be addressed by this Panel until there has been a determination that a prima facie case was established. I am satisfied that a prima facie has been established. McLennan filed his complaint in November 1994. The Board conducted informal discussions between McLennan and the Union in an attempt to resolve difficulties that existed between the parties. Those discussions were not successful. Further discussions did not occur between the Union and McLennan. The Union’s agreement to file a written submission was not fulfilled. On May 2, 1995 the Board wrote the parties stating that the complaint had been reviewed under Section 13(1)(a) of the Code: “the panel has determined that the complaint does disclose a prima facie case.” The Board again asked for written submissions from the Union and the Employer. The matter now proceeds under Section 13 (b)(ii) of the Code: whether the Union is in breach of Section 12.
21 Second, both parties caused significant delay in these proceeding to a hearing. The complaint was filed in November 1994. On December 13, 1994, the Deputy Registrar wrote to McLennan informing him that the Union agreed to review McLennan’s case and then discuss the merits of his grievances with him. Nothing happened until May 2, 1995 when the Board notified the parties the complainant had established a prima facie case. Further discussions between the parties occurred on May 18, 1995 when the Board brought the parties together. The Union finally responded to McLennan’s allegations on May 30, 1995: five months after the Deputy Registrar’s December 13 letter to McLennan.
22 It took McLennan two months to file a reply to the May 30 submission. Further, although asked, McLennan did not send his reply to the Union or the Employer. The Board sent his submission to these parties in September 1995 when it discovered this had not been done. Finally, McLennan waited until late January 1996 (six months later) to inform the Board that he intended to proceed with his complaint. These delays have made dealing with the merits of the case very difficult and very time consuming.
23 Third, McLennan’s submissions demonstrate that from August 20, 1994 to July 25, 1995 the relationship between McLennan and the Union degenerated with speed and intensity. As will be seen, I accept that the Union failed to represent him in certain situations. However, the merits of McLennan’s case became lost in his frustration. McLennan attacked the Union for its failure to pursue his grievances. He went on to attack the Union’s representatives professionally and personally. He attacked the Union and the Employer for having a “cozy” relationship. He attacked the Employer’s representatives personally. None of this assisted McLennan.
24 Finally, a Union executive’s relative worked for the Employer. McLennan says the Union sought to assist certain managers to advance by promotion. McLennan suggested that his “rocking the boat” caused the Union Employer to work together against him. These were allegations. The evidence does not support these allegations. An inference cannot be drawn. More importantly, the Union worked with the Employer to ensure a viable operation within the terms of the collective agreement. While an employee or even a group of employees may see this as detrimental in some circumstances, the overall approach of the parties is to be commended.
(vi) Review of the May 30 and July 25 Submissions
25 I now address the Union’s May 30 submission and McLennan’s reply of July 25. Again, general comments must be made.
26 First, the parties’ submissions address the merits of the grievances filed on McLennan’s behalf. Board decisions are clear on our reluctance to consider the merits of grievance(s) in Section 12 complaints. McLennan’s counsel accepts this premise in his submissions. A main issue in McLennan’s complaint, however, is whether the Union considered the merits of his grievances and whether the decision not to pursue the grievances establish that the Union acted in an arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith manner towards McLennan: that is, it breached Section 12 of the Code. Such a determination does require a review of the grievances. The review will focus, however, on whether the Union’s views were informed and not on the merits of their interpretation of the collective agreement
27 Second, the Board’s May 25, 1995 letter to the Union requested the Union to respond to the “essential elements of the complaint.” The Union’s May 30 submission restricts its response to its “position on the key elements of Mr. McLennan’s section 12 complaint.” The Board received McLennan’s reply on July 25, 1995. McLennan says he never agreed to deal with only the “key elements” of his grievances. I do not accept his statement. Restricting the Union’s submission to essential or key elements makes a great deal of sense. The parties met with the Board on May 18, 1995 to discuss McLennan’s complaints. A better understanding of the issues, by both parties, was no doubt achieved. Given the number of grievances and some overlap between them, restricting the Union’s May 30 submission to only the essential elements of his complaints must have been necessary.
28 Finally, a distinction must be made between the Union’s conduct during the grievance procedure and its May 30 submission. Its conduct during the grievance procedure will be examined under Section 12. Its May 30 submission is the Union’s attempt to remedy any breach of Section 12. The Union’s failure to provide a full and complete remedy in its May 30 submission is not a further breach of Section 12. I accept the Union’s argument that if the May 30 submission dealt with all outstanding grievances, a significant remedy of its breach of Section 12 would have been achieved.
- a) Breaches of Section 12
29 I start with four straight forward matters on which I accept McLennan’s argument that the Union breached Section 12. First, the Union’s July 9, 1996 submission appears to concede that while it had discussions with McLennan during 1994, it was not up to speed on the details of the grievances going into the grievance meetings. During the grievance meetings McLennan presented his grievances on his own behalf. The Union appears to accept that it failed to represent McLennan throughout the grievance procedures. A union files grievances on a member’s behalf. It has an obligation to at least understand the merits of the grievance. Its lack of knowledge of McLennan’s grievances resulted in it saying little or nothing about his grievances at the meetings.
30 Second, McLennan says the Employer harassed and berated him in work related issues; notably statements made in the grievance procedure. The Employer did not make a submission denying these allegations. The Union’s May 30 submission states that “Complaints such as this are extremely difficult to deal with in that proving any such activity is near impossible.” The Union’s written submission further argues that it need not address McLennan’s allegation of the Employer’s harassment towards him. Its submission reads:
…a trade union is not statutorally required to adjust interpersonal relationships between employees and their supervisors. Their obligations are related to representing employees in respect of their rights under the Labour Relations Code.
I disagree with the Union’s submissions. The Employer’s improper conduct occurred primarily during the grievance procedure: an event covered by the collective agreement. The Union’s representative was present at the grievance meetings when many of the Employer’s improper comments were made. He apparently said nothing on McLennan’s behalf. He likely could have stopped the Employer had he made an effort to do so. Regardless, a union can take steps in response to an employer’s improper conduct in the grievance procedure. A grievance can be filed seeking various remedies. An arbitrator may allow considerable latitude of employer and union antagonism in a grievance meeting. It is unlikely, however, that such latitude would be permitted in the employer’s conduct towards the grievor. In any event, Sections 5(1)(b) and (d) of the Code specifically prohibit an employer from threatening an employee for exercising his/her rights. The Employer threatened McLennan in exercising his right to file a grievance: a right under Section 84 of the Code. The Union breached its duty to represent McLennan when it allowed the Employer to deal with him in an abusive and offensive manner during the grievance meetings.
31 Third, McLennan grieved the seniority given to him by the Employer under Article 19 of the collective agreement. He gave reasons why he thought his position on the Employer’s seniority list was incorrect. The Union said that any error could be corrected once it was advised of the specifics. McLennan was specific. The Union’s investigation on his behalf should have been done in April 1994. It should have been done in May 1995. The Union failed to investigate his seniority on either occasion..
32 Fourth, the Union said it had no knowledge of McLennan’s request for a leave of absence (Article 11.05) for December 1994. McLennan notes the several times he discussed this request with the Union. I accept McLennan’s allegation. The Employer may have properly denied the request, however, there is no doubt the Union knew of his request. It made no effort to represent this grievance.
33 I find that in each of these four matters the Union represented McLennan in a perfunctory manner. It failed to address the merits of his grievance. These issues constitute a breach of Section 12.
34 Finally, on August 26, 1994 the Union filed another grievance on McLennan’s behalf addressing the assignment of shifts, McLennan’s rights as a first aid attendant and certain Employer instructions concerning the filling out of WCB regulations. It appears that these issues were addressed, in part, in the Union’s response to other grievances it filed on McLennan’s behalf. The Union’s decision to not purse the August 26 grievances may be consistent with a broad based interpretation of the collective agreement; however, the Union’s May 30 submission did not address the August 26, 1994 grievances with sufficient clarity.
- b) Non-Breaches of Section 12
35 I turn now to other matters. McLennan takes considerable issue with “certain policies and practices in place” that the Employer continued to his detriment in response to his grievances. In reading his earlier submissions, McLennan made an effort to demonstrate their inconsistency with the actual collective agreement. McLennan’s submission by his counsel went on to argue that “it is well established in arbitral jurisprudence that company policy must be applied reasonably and in a manner not inconsistent with the terms of the collective agreement.” Blatant disregard for an employee’s rights are relevant to a Section 12 complaint. However, agreed upon past practice and policy have a significant impact on the interpretation of the collective agreement. The issue in a Section 12 complaint is whether the terms of a collective agreement are being applied incorrectly or unfairly to the specific detriment of the complainant. An interpretation of the agreement that is not based on its specific application to the complainant is not relevant to a Section 12 complaint. The Union’s interpretation were not generally a specific application to McLennan’s detriment.
36 McLennan asked the Union for notes taken by the Union’s representative in the grievance meetings. The Union refused. McLennan argued that these were written records and he was entitled to them. I agree with him to this extent. If the Union’s notes were a record of the meetings that were available to the Employer, the notes should have been given to McLennan. It does not appear the Union’s notes were a formal record. They were the notes of a Union representative; notes the Union was not obliged to keep during a grievance. McLennan was not entitled to these notes as part of his attempt to establish a prima facie case. McLennan’s right to such notes may have changed once a prima facie case was established. McLennan’s submission on August 26, 1996 states that the Union’s notes of the grievance meetings were made available to McLennan and his counsel in making their final submission to the Board. This issue was resolved.
37 The remaining grievances filed by McLennan on March 18, 1994 were sufficiently addressed in the Union’s May 30 response. McLennan filed a grievance under Article 24. Article 24.03 permits the Employer to change an employee’s shift in certain circumstance, including 24 hour notice. McLennan accepted that explanation. McLennan grieved under Article 15.03. He believed that he had the right to replace absent employees if he was the most senior person available. The Union explained that such a right does not exist in the agreement as it is not workable. McLennan disagreed. On its face, the agreement is not clear. Article 24.04(a) refers to both the right of employees and to the right of the Employer in these circumstances. The Union’s position is based on the broad application of the article to all members of the bargaining unit. Such a broad interpretation of the collective agreement defeats the Section 12 complaint of one employee.
38 McLennan relied upon his first aid qualifications in some of his grievances: it also arose in his August 26 grievances. In reading his letters he appears to argue that he was employed as a first-aid attendant who was also required to perform production work. The Union clearly explained why it did not pursue this matter. The Union noted that McLennan’s first-aid certification was not a position in the agreement: it is a premium paid for hours worked. Unless a right in the agreement is provided for that position, McLennan’s rights were based on the position he held and the seniority he had accumulated. His “first-aid seniority” would not be of assistance in requiring the Employer to give him overtime shifts. It would not prevent the Employer from changing his shift as long as it did so pursuant to the agreement; even if the purpose of the change was related to its first-aid requirements. Further, McLennan’s complaint referred to the impact of Employer policy and practice on other employees. As noted above, that is not relevant to his Section 12 complaint. These matters do not constitute a breach of Section 12.
39 McLennan’s March, 1994 grievance addressed his vacation rights. In refusing a vacation request, the collective agreement and past practice were discussed. The Union points this out in its May 30 submission. It appears, however, that discussions fell apart when the Union and Employer took offense with McLennan referring to their “cozy” relationship. No doubt those kind of comments were not accepted. No doubt the ability to discuss grievances rationally began to deteriorate. In terms of the grievance, however, the Union’s May 30 submission does address the merits of McLennan’s complaint.
40 I turn now to the August 20, 1994 grievance. McLennan’s original letter does not set out a specific grievance. He takes issue with the Union’s handling of the March 18, grievances. I have dealt with these grievances above.
41 The Union filed grievances on McLennan’s behalf in November 1994. The Union’s May 30 submission relies upon the collective agreement and past practice in not pursuing these grievances. Several examples of past events were given. McLennan’s July 25 submission continues to seek a review of the merits of each of his grievances. He also disputes the appropriateness of past practices. McLennan’s request seeks a review far beyond what the Board will undertake. I have reviewed the basic merits of his case, the collective agreement and the Union’s May 30 submission. The essential elements of his November grievances were addressed by the Union.
42 Finally, McLennan’s November, 1994 grievance letters addressed his rights under Section 19 of the collective agreement. An employee’s bumping, lay off and recall rights are based on his/her seniority. It is necessary that McLennan’s seniority be determined properly. If his seniority was correctly posted through this period no issue arises. If not posted properly, the Union’s failure to follow up on his repeated request resulted in his inability to exercise rights under the agreement. This matter will be addressed in addressing the matter of his proper seniority.
43 In summary, the Union’s May 30, 1995 submission addressed virtually all of McLennan’s grievances in an informed manner. Its interpretation of the collective agreement and its application to McLennan’s grievances were reasonable.
44 McLennan argues that the Union’s conduct was clearly arbitrary and in bad faith. McLennan was clearly upset with the Union’s conduct. In specific areas, he had reason to be so. In other areas, however, I am satisfied that the grievances that were addressed in the Union’s May 30 submission were done so in a fair and reasoned manner.
(vii) Conclusion
45 The last issue is remedy. McLennan seeks a broad range of compensation, including the cost of his counsel. McLennan requests that outstanding grievances be referred to arbitration absent any time limit restrictions. McLennan also requests his own counsel, paid for by the Union, represent him in those arbitrations. I do not see arbitration appropriate in the circumstances. The parties met in informal discussions on May 18, 1995. Essential issues were isolated and most of those issues were responded to on May 30, 1995. I need only instruct that the review of outstanding grievances continue.
46 McLennan seeks a make whole order including his counsel’s cost. The Board has the jurisdiction to make such an order but this is not the case to do so. The Union did not fulfill its entire obligation as McLennan’s representative in the grievance procedure. However, McLennan caused a considerable amount of problem throughout these events. Consideration of a make whole remedy, given his conduct, is not appropriate.
47 I am satisfied the following are appropriate in all the circumstances. The Union and the Employer will reconvene the grievance procedure and address McLennan’s seniority and the rights he had from that seniority. The Union will understand McLennan’s position and ensure it is put to the Employer for proper application of the collective agreement.
48 The Union was aware of McLennan’s request for a leave of absence for Christmas 1994 but did not address the request in its May 30, 1995 submission. The Union and Employer will discuss whether McLennan had a right to a leave of absence that he was not permitted to exercise. If rights were lost and damages were incurred, a remedy will be discussed. The Board remains seized of this matter.
49 The Union and Employer will also address the grievances filed by McLennan on August 26, 1996. The written argument of McLennan’s counsel sets out the specific elements of those grievances:
This grievance complained that shifts were asssigned [sic] to junior employees (Art. 24.04), that the company refused to accept his qualifications as a first aid attendant (Art. 10.02), that the company instructed Mr. McLennan to complete WCB forms incorrectly and contrary to WCB regulations, that the company used Mr. McLennan as a first aid and stille [sic] refused to reimburse his cost of taking the certification (but reimbursed others used in that capacity). A part of this grievance was a letter of understanding (dated August 20, 1994) that Mr. McLennan had prepared when Mr. Pelzer instructed him (as a first aid attendant) to be responsible for the first air room and to complete WCB forms contrary to the Regulations.
Certain areas of this submission were addressed and resolved in the Union’s May 30 submission. These grievances will be discussed with that in mind.
50 Finally, the Union is directed to discuss with the Employer the inappropriateness of its rude and abusive conduct to a grievor during a grievance meeting. The Employer is expected to acknowledge the inappropriateness of such conduct.
51 Mr. Wayne Mullins, a Special Investigating Officer with the Board is available to attend the grievance meeting and to assist in its success if requested. The parties may contact him directly.
52 Finally, McLennan has filed further Section 12 complaints that address other aspects of his representation by the Union. Neither the Employer, the Union, nor McLennan are compelled by this decision to discuss grievances that are included in those other complaints. However, I ask the parties to discuss with Wayne Mullins the possibility of again focusing on the essential elements of these grievances and reviewing them prior to the Section 12 complaint being addressed by the Board.
Complaint allowed in part.