Decisions

Greyhound Contractors Not Employees Under the Canada Labour Code

Apr 23, 1999

Part III of the Code (Standard Hours, Wages, Vacations and Holidays) applies to an “employee”,but there is no definition to assist in the determination of employee status. Part III applies to “employment in or in connection with the operation of any federal work, undertaking or business” (see Section 167). Various provisions of Part III refer to “employees” and “employers”. For the purposes of Part III, an “employer” is defined to mean “any person who employs one or more employees”. There is no dispute that the parties are under the federal jurisdiction and there is no dispute that owner-operators, i.e., Lefler and Kummer, are dependent contractor within the meaning — and for the purposes — of Part I of the Code. They enjoy union representation and are covered by a collective agreement. This aspect is one of the unusual features of this case. In the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that Lefler and Kummer are not employees.

Vacation Pay – Canada Labour Code

Dec 23, 1997

Union breached duty by allowing employer to treat complainant abusively and offensively during meetings

Mar 15, 1997

The Union and the Employer will reconvene the grievance procedure and address McLennan’s seniority and the rights he had from that seniority. The Union will understand McLennan’s position and ensure it is put to the Employer for proper application of the collective agreement. The Union and Employer will discuss whether McLennan had a right to a leave of absence that he was not permitted to exercise. If rights were lost and damages were incurred, a remedy will be discussed. The Board remains seized of this matter. The Union and Employer will also address the grievances filed by McLennan on August 26, 1996. The written argument of McLennan’s counsel sets out the specific elements of those grievances: Finally, the Union is directed to discuss with the Employer the inappropriateness of its rude and abusive conduct to a grievor during a grievance meeting. The Employer is expected to acknowledge the inappropriateness of such conduct.

Re-classification of Newspaper Employees – Arbitration

Jun 15, 1991

This proceeding is concerned with a grievance by the incumbents in the Ledger Telephone Collector (hereinafter the “Collector”) position in which they seek reclassification of their position to “key rate* level. As of the date of their grievance, i.e., April 19, 1989F the incumbents in the Collector position were paid a minimum salary of $543.14 a week. The key rate at that same time was $911.53 a week.

Collective Agreement – Life Insurance

May 30, 1991

The arbitrator concluded, therefore, that the life insurance benefit that ought to have been paid to Mrs. Calbeck on the death of her husband was the amount twice his annual salary, as per art. 24(a)(3) of the collective agreement. I have found that annual salary has the same meaning as “Annual Earnings” in app. “B”. The definition of “Annual Earnings” states that it is the “Weekly Earnings” (calculated, logically, for an entire year) at the earlier of (a) the date the employee became disabled, or (b) the date of the death of the employee. For Mr. Slater, therefore, the relevant date is the date he became disabled.

Court held that it was open to the board and the council to continue to apply the interpretation with which the court had earlier disagreed

Jan 15, 1990

Mr. Justice Bouck, by holding that the board’s interpretation was not patently unreasonable, should not be taken to have concluded that his construction of the statute was the only reasonable interpretation to be given to it. The effect of his finding that the board’s interpretation was not patently unreasonable is that its construction can be rationally supported by the legislation. If the board’s interpretation is a rational one, then it is within the jurisdiction of the board to continue to apply that interpretation. If that were not so, then the exclusive jurisdiction of the board would be illusory, and the final say on legal questions would be left to the courts. The doctrine of curial deference would be meaningless. Clearly, it is not open to the court to order that an administrative tribunal must apply the court’s view of the law when there is more than one reasonable interpretation to be given to legislation.